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Poverty and Community:
Understanding Culture and Politics in Poor Places
Mil Duncan
Sociology Department
Director of the Carsey Institute

P

overty is on the nation’s radar screen
again—and there is a consensus building across
the political spectrum that we need policies that
(1) encourage work and make it pay, (2) support working families, and (3) invest in educating poor children.
We have good research that shows how important employment is, and how much parents need support when
they work. But programs and policies that directly
support working families and their children are not
enough. We also need policies that strengthen community institutions and address the bundle of problems plaguing people in poor communities. This paper
shows how culture and politics perpetuate poverty by
undermining core institutions in chronically depressed
communities. In this paper I briefly summarize what
urban researchers have concluded about how neighborhoods affect poor children, youth, and families; discuss
what I have learned in poor rural areas; and consider
what these findings mean for policy to address poverty
and place.
What is poverty? British sociologist Peter Townshend
argues that “poverty is the lack of adequate resources to
participate in the accepted ways in society.” This definition reflects new thinking in the UK and Europe about
“social exclusion” and the “marginalized”—people who
are cut off from the mainstream and not participating
in the wider society. Today some 37 million Americans
live below the official poverty line of $20,000 for a family of four. Seventeen percent of all children are poor
today, 24 percent of black children and 22 percent of
children of Hispanic origin are poor; in rural America
half of all Black kids and a third of Hispanic and Native
American kids grow up poor. In some areas poverty
rates are over 50 percent. In 1959, when we began measuring poverty, 39.5 million people were poor. Poverty
declined in the sixties and early seventies, and in 1973
was at its lowest with 23 million poor. After World War
II we had 25 years of widely shared growth, and policies like the GI Bill and mortgage assistance programs
helped working class Americans join the middle class.
Since 1973 we have seen growing inequality, and falling

wages as well as an increase in single parenting have
meant high poverty rates.
Social policies in some developed countries keep
child poverty low and minimize how much a child’s
family affects his or her achievements. Government
investments in child care, early childhood education,
family allowances, maternal and paternal leave, and
higher education all counter the tendency of pure market forces to increase inequality and produce poverty.
This is not the case in America. While we support the
elderly through Social Security and Medicare, our policies for low income families do not reflect broad public
responsibility for child outcomes. We rely on the market and families themselves to provide opportunities.
And we have not really addressed the strains created
when mothers are in the workforce. Even after Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), we still
approach social policy as a safety net (temporary assistance) rather than as public investment in our shared
future.
Why does poverty persist? The “culture” explanations say “poor people are just not trying hard,” and the
“structural” explanations place the blame on racism or
exploitation or the unfair outcomes associated with the
way the free market works. In other words, some say
poor people do not take responsibility for themselves
and their families. Others say the poor face a lack of
opportunity—too few jobs, bad schools, racism and
sexism. Of course, our ideas about why people are poor
influences what kind of policies we develop to help the
poor. Many of the explicitly anti-poverty programs in
America emerged during the 1960s and 70s. Kennedy
was struck by the idea that those not “lifted by the rising tide” were trapped in “a culture of poverty.” Lewis
had originally introduced the notion of a “culture of
poverty,” a “way of life...passed down from generation
to generation,” characterized by apathy, hopelessness,
and hostility and suspicion. He said persistent poverty
occurred when the poor were not integrated into society. This lack of integration is similar to the concept of
social exclusion.
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In the 1980s de-industrialization and loss of manufacturing jobs available to people with limited education coincided with increasing suburbanization and
the flight of the middle class from the cities. Poverty
became more concentrated in the inner cities, and there
were more teen pregnancies, out of wedlock births,
increasing dropouts, gangs and drugs. These problems
were attributed to “bad behavior.” People began to talk
about a new underclass—a group with a different “culture,” different values. Wilson began his research on the
underclass in Chicago during this period, and looked
at both the structure (who gets what opportunities) and
the culture in these neighborhoods. He argued there
were two key changes: the black middle class left the
ghetto as affirmative action opened up opportunities
to do so, leaving neighborhoods with no role models;
disinvestment in core community institutions followed.
Work disappeared, especially for low-skill workers who
had had good-paying, stable blue collar jobs.
Following Wilson a new generation of poverty studies emerged examining these “neighborhood effects.”
In a 1990 review Jencks and Mayer said at-risk youth
in areas with concentrated poverty were influenced
by collective socialization, the influence of peers, and
failed institutions. Duncan and Brooks Gunn found
that neighborhoods had a greater impact on child outcomes than families, and the key to better outcomes
was not fewer poor neighbors, but rather more middle
income neighbors. Anderson’s work in Philadelphia
documented the battle between “street culture” and
“decent culture,” and the declining influence of the
“old heads” who used to guide young people into the
mainstream. In the late 1990s Furstenberg studied poor
families in Philadelphia’s tough neighborhoods. While
parenting effectiveness did not vary by neighborhoods,
he did find that poor families benefit from strong community institutions and that communities with more
middle income families have stronger institutions. His
team concluded, “Our family-centered political culture
does not recognize how much parental success itself is
interwoven into a system of opportunity and inequality of life chances that are set by economic and political
priorities.” Similarly, Morenoff and Sampson’s work
on “collective efficacy” combines ideas of trust, social
control and community institutions. So there is now a
large body of research that shows community conditions make a difference for the poor, and the more they
are mixed in with middle class people the better their
chances for escaping poverty. These results resonate
with my findings about poor rural families in Worlds
Apart.1

Persistently poor rural places are divided into
two classes: the haves and the have-nots. The poor
are socially isolated, worlds apart from the haves. In
persistently poor communities the middle class is a
small group, and those with middle incomes hold
themselves separate from the poor, investing in separate institutions like schools and churches. There is no
middle class holding public officials and employers accountable, and the public sector is corrupt.
Two concepts are important here: cultural tool kit
and civic culture. Over time the “culture of poverty”
has come to be a way to blame the poor for their poverty. Swidler developed the idea of the cultural tool kit.
She sees culture as a “tool kit of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views,” skills and habits, not preferences and wants, what we know of the world, what people
like us do. She gives the example of a young boy from
the inner city who is asked why he does not want to be
a doctor, and, because it is so far from what he knows
and can imagine, says “who? me?” Your cultural tool
kit is filled by your immediate world, your community. The second concept refers to how things are done
in the community—the civic culture. What are the
community norms? How does the community work?
There are three key elements to civic culture: trust,
participation, and collective investment—the intangible goods. This idea is like collective efficacy. Places
with high levels of trust, wide participation, and real
community investment have community institutions
that offer greater opportunities for poor people to escape poverty. Recall that many of the culture of poverty concepts are just the opposite of these: distrust
(hostility and suspicion one researcher said) and lack
of engagement in society’s mainstream institutions.
The community I studied in Appalachia has been
one of the poorest places in America over a long time.
Life in coal communities today is still shaped by what
went on in the early days when coal mining was very
competitive, and Appalachian historians describe
how operators took over local politics in the early
1900s so they could control everything, fearful that
participation in civic life would encourage unions. As
one historian put it: “The operators are not only the
miner’s employer, they are his landlord, his merchant,

I conducted a multi-year study of persistent poverty in Appalachia, the Mississippi Delta, and for comparative purposes, a remote northern New England
community with lower poverty. My colleagues and I conducted over 350 indepth, open-ended interviews—not just with the poor, but with the rich and
middle class as well. We collected and analyzed the interviewees’ life histories
and experiences in their community, looking for patterns that would help explain why chronic poverty plagued Appalachia and the Delta.
1
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the provider of his amusements, the sanitary officer of
the town, sometimes the source of police protection
and the patron of his physician, his minister, and his
school teacher. It is paternalistic, in some ways a feudal civilization.” The result was control and vulnerability, distrust, and the suppression of any civic participation. When the mines mechanized after World
War II, there were huge job cuts, and hundreds of
thousands left the region. Those who stayed without
good jobs pieced together a livelihood with odd jobs.
Many relied on welfare. When I talked with people
in the 1990s their refrain was how scarce jobs were—
“you can’t even buy a job.”
People from all walks of life describe two classes:
some joking there are the “good rich people” and the
“bad poor people.” Others distinguish between those
who work and those who “draw” welfare. One man
said, People that want to work are the same as people
that do work because they’re still trying to work. And
then there’s people who don’t want to work at all, never
have and never will. We call them first-of-the-monthers
because they come out of the mountains the first of the
month with about ten kids and don’t wash. When I
worked at the grocery store, you could smell them coming. But they just draw food stamps and stuff like that.
They live like that, and I guess that’s the way they want
to live.”
These are small communities where the great majority of people still live where they were born and
grew up. Family name matters. “A lot of times you can
hear somebody’s last name and before you even meet,
you’ve already got the idea that they’re either a good
person or they’re sorry as can be.”... Those that have a
family with a horrible name, when they come in, we
know them, and they’re not worth two cents. They’re
sorry as can be—Stealing, selling dope, bootlegging,
picked up for driving drunk, in and out of bankruptcy
court.” Everyone can identify the “families that run
things,” and people are wary of them. You have to be
very careful here. You have to be extremely careful. If
you’re not careful, you’ll make enemies, and you don’t
want to make enemies-especially if you don’t have importance. If they blackball you, you will not be able to
get a job flipping burgers.”
Civic life is not “civic”—politics are corrupt, a welloiled patronage system works for public jobs, with
no accountability, and private jobs are based on who
you know and what your family name is. Schools
for the poor—county schools rather than the more
elite “county seat schools”—are chaotic, with low
expectations. Here teachers get their jobs by whom

they know and how they voted, not how well they
teach. Life is family-based and church-based, and
families and churches are grouped by social class. As
one minister told it, I see people very, very concerned
about their own families, and their concern stops there.
They’re strongly family oriented here. And they would
do anything for their family. Let’s just say they are very
defensive about the rights of their family. They don’t
want to be criticized. They don’t want to be treated unfairly. They have a great concern for their own family.
I’ve talked to my congregation. This concern ought to
go beyond family. The professional and business class
families are insulated from the poor who make up the
majority of their county. They live in the county seat,
send their children to the city school where they are
active in a Parent-Teacher organization and participate in school events, and attend the old established
churches.
Let me describe one young mother, Gwen, whose
story is typical in many ways. She grew up very poor,
often without enough food. Her parents were strict
and religious, and she eventually rebelled and ran
with a bad crowd. She dropped out, got pregnant,
then married at 17 after her child was born. When we
talked she was a waitress and her husband ran a skidder—and the work was of course seasonal. They were
struggling to get by, even with both of them working.
The marriage was strained. Her hopes for her children
are revealing about her own life and Appalachia itself:
I want them not to drop out, not to end up sitting on
the porch all day. I want my girl not to marry and get
pregnant too young, but to have a good family when
she is ready. If she does marry, I would like her to have
her own job and a car of her own, know how to drive,
and not to be totally dependent on a man. And then my
boys, I don’t want them to have children and then go
to work, and barely be able to feed them, or barely be
able to put diapers on them, and just have to scrounge,
like Billy and myself. My boys, I don’t want them in the
mines. I want them to do better for themselves. You
know, they don’t have to be doctors or lawyers. They
can be teachers, nurses, social workers. Even like the
restaurant work, maybe they may want to get to be
the operator or owner of it, but not just work in it as a
hard, scrounging, everyday job to get by.”
I found the same pattern of two classes, haves and
have-nots, in the Mississippi Delta, although with a
stark racial dimension. Again, everyone can name
the few families who “run things.” They are called
“bossmen” by blacks, “farmers” by whites. But blacks
and whites agree you do not want to “cross them.”
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“They will cut you out” or “run you out.” Racism
runs throughout these communities’ institutions
where longstanding patterns of segregation persist.
There are two worlds. The white academy absorbs
the white community’s civic energy, fundraising and
volunteering, and sports involvement. The largely
black public school is chaotic and struggling to keep
its accreditation. More than 1,500 black families live
in poverty compared to about 200 white families.
But these places include very wealthy farmers, and
over the last thirty years farms have become larger.
There is great wealth for the few, deep poverty for
most, and virtually no middle class, white or black.
“There are four middle-class white families here, three
or four,” a storekeeper told me. As for the black middle class, most agree with the black school teacher
who said, “Our black middle class are those who have
left for the city.”
Whites own almost all the property and businesses
and control all the jobs; blacks must seek jobs, credit,
and housing from whites, and sometimes from those
blacks who act on whites’ behalf. Blacks work for white
families and farms as domestics, cooks, tractor drivers, field hands, and for white-run businesses as factory workers stitching at the apparel plant or cutting
off fish heads at the catfish plant. Blacks’ opportunities
to work are always vulnerable to whites’ decisions—for
example one white truck driver’s wife explained: If one
of the blacks was to piss Jimmy off—you know he drives
for a farmer—he could make it hard on him if he said
something to his boss. He could make it really hard on
the boy, make him get fired. It’s just over here the blacks
don’t have the opportunities that whites does. They’re
really disgraded.” The white elite control the political machinery, but also, with high illiteracy among
poor blacks in the community, blacks vote with whites
out of habit and deference. A black leader explained:
Blacks who have known only the plantation and a life
in which they relied on the bossman will vote with him
out of habit and deference. ... uneducated people need
to go through someone, they need to get help from Toms
that have been there for a long time and the whites have
gained control of them.
Caroline is a single mom who grew up in a family of 13 in a two room shack—hot in the summer,
cold in the winter. At an early age she dropped out of
school, encouraged to do so by the principal, to help
at home and work in the fields.To escape, she married
and went to Chicago. But it was hard: He was terrible,
awful. He started beating me. It was awful. Then one
day—after we been there about a month—when he was

high, he put a knife to my throat, said he was going
to cut my throat, going to kill me. See this scar here,
buried down in my neck? Then he put a gun on my
forehead, cocked the gun, said he was going to kill me. I
just said, “I don’t care. Go ahead.” I was tired. I wanted
to be home. I wanted to be rid of him.”. . . I just left.
And I was lost in big old Chicago. But being in the city!
Think what that was like! You never been anywhere.
Stayed in the country, hardly ever come to town. Come
to town sometimes on a Saturday, taking turns, my sister would go one Saturday, I’d go another, my brother
go the next Saturday. That’s the way we’d do, the way
we went to town. I hadn’t ever come out of the country,
and all of a sudden I end up in a big city.
When she returned home to the Delta she got into
a bad life of drinking, many men, no work, and had
children out of wedlock. But a few years before we
talked she had been converted by a local evangelist,
and now she was trying to do right by her children,
and her advice to them is telling about how she sees
her own life: “I use my life with my kids as an example.
I say, “I’m a mother thirty-four years old. Here I got all
five of you all.” I say, “what do you all think?” I let them
explain to me what they think about life. Do they think
I should be married or have a husband? I have five kids
that need me. “you got one daddy,” I say to my son. I
tell my older daughter that she has a different daddy.
“You all ain’t got the same daddy. Do you think that
should be? You know, that’s not right. And I don’t want
you to grow up like that thinking it is...” You can be
married before you have a child. And before you marry, take time to know yourself and find yourself and
grow. Go to school and do something that you want to
do. Don’t just jump in and marry.
Like Gwen, Caroline wants her children to avoid
her mistakes and be successful. But she lives in a poor
neighborhood in this plantation driven county, with
violence and vandalism all around her. Her children
attend dysfunctional schools, where knife “cuttings”
are common and there are few after-school programs
or opportunities for sports or music. What her children see about how “people like us” act and fit in the
community is shaped by that immediate community
and its institutions. The poor black community lives
separately from the well-to-do white community, and
whites still have the power. It is hard to bring about
change. As one black leader said: “It’s going to take
years to change this. How can you defeat a guy that has
got half of the people working for him or that benefit
from him, whether through a job, living in one of his
houses, or going through him to get loans? How are you
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going to defeat him? They feel obligated to him because
they’ve worked for him or he’s provided them jobs.”
These patterns are anchored in the way the economy was organized a century ago. One day a coal
operator set up a company store and required miners
to shop there, or a plantation bossman told his workers their children would continue to pick cotton and
miss school, even after the plantation schools themselves were closed. Maybe the owner of a coal company handpicked the sheriff during an election, who
then ran out unruly laborers interested in organizing
a union. Maybe a sharecropper who questioned the
bossman’s handling of his account in the plantation
store was evicted and blackballed from employment.
Over time these decisions, rules, and experiences
defined how people relate to one another and became
patterns that people expect, norms governing how
things are always done. They form the civic culture.
These relationships and norms are reinforced by overt
action of those who benefit from them, but they are
also maintained through memory and tradition, reputation and family history. People know each other’s
families across generations, their good deeds and bad,
power and vulnerability, and successes and failures.
The structure of daily life that takes shape over time
is taken for granted. Because new ideas and new resources rarely penetrate this environment, people
form their cultural tool kit in the context of the relationships and norms they know.
And while the poor are trapped in dead-end parttime jobs and ignored in disorganized schools, vulnerable to the internal politics and personal whims
of managers, the haves live comfortably in a rural
suburbia. In the Delta they send their children to the
private school, in Appalachia their children go to the
independent public school in the county seat. With
their neighbors, they support school and church programs that benefit their own families. They know one
another, look out for each other’s children, and devote themselves above all to their family and church.
In many ways their lives include all the good things
we look for in small community life—familiarity,
neighborliness, safety, and a good pace. When middle
income families ally themselves with the rich and
powerful and safeguard their privileges and control,
there is no group that holds local politicians or private
employers accountable for good, fair government or
just labor practices. There is no group investing time
and money to build strong public institutions like
schools, recreation facilities and programs, or libraries. Potential middle class families look out for their

own children, accept the corruption and patronage,
and do not challenge the status quo. The combination
of distrust and the greed people see in public and private life prevents cooperation.
In the early days of Appalachia’s coal economy and
the Delta’s plantation economy, operators and bossmen maintained tight control over workers—not just
in the workplace, but in every dimension of social and
political life. Poor people learned that the way to get
along was to accept the way things were, to do what
was expected, to not speak out or make waves. Those
who did not accept the status quo found they were
ostracized or openly encouraged to leave, forced to
choose “exit” over “voice,” to use development scholar
Albert Hirschman’s terms for migration and political
activism. In most cases those who gained an education had to leave to find decent work. The climate was
not welcoming to newcomers, so few moved in bringing new perspectives. The inequality and political grip
of the powerful went unchallenged decade after decade, and in the 1990s you could see the result in high
poverty and a weak civic culture.
Poor people grow up in social isolation from those
who control opportunities in the Delta and Appalachia. With their own family and narrow networks as
their social world, they have a hard time absorbing
the habits, skills, and images that might help them
enter the mainstream. Their lives are intertwined,
they see each other every day, but they live in different
worlds, worlds apart. There are some very important
cases of individuals—teachers, aunties and uncles,
grandparents—inspiring or guiding young people
to a life outside poverty. Expanding the tool kits and
overcoming the effect of the community. But this is
not the pattern—most fall into making those bad decisions, and there are few mechanisms for building a
good life and few chances for mobility.
The stories I heard in these rural communities
give a firsthand picture of the way inequality can
undermine the public sector, the “public or social
goods,” the community institutions the public sector
supports—on which the poor rely to improve their
life chances. There is limited investment but also
limited accountability. Community institutions do
not work. Generous individuals’ actions matter, and
can help a few escape, but without more widespread
investment in community institutions those from
poor families do not have much of a chance to achieve
the American Dream. There is a door opening for
better policy approaches to strengthen families and
improve outcomes for children and youth. These
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are encouraging signs. But I think there is also good
research showing that the effectiveness of these policies also depends on how communities “work,” and
part of our policy agenda should be to preserve the
middle class and strengthen the community institutions that provide pathways into the middle class. We
need policies that recognize the intersection between
culture (as tool kit that informs those decisions young
people are making) and the civic culture that shapes
community institutions. So as individuals we can be
mentors and coaches who help those in poor families
believe in themselves and make the decisions that lead
to a better life, but as citizens we also must support
good schools and strive to keep neighborhoods mixed
rather than segregated by class, and support policies
that truly provide equal opportunity.
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